Admiralty - Exclusive Coverage by Longshoremen\u27s and Harbor Workers\u27 Act of Railway Employer\u27s Liability to Employee for Accident on Car Float by Barnett, Richard B., S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 52 Issue 3 
1954 
Admiralty - Exclusive Coverage by Longshoremen's and Harbor 
Workers' Act of Railway Employer's Liability to Employee for 
Accident on Car Float 
Richard B. Barnett S.Ed. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Admiralty Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Transportation Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard B. Barnett S.Ed., Admiralty - Exclusive Coverage by Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act of 
Railway Employer's Liability to Employee for Accident on Car Float, 52 MICH. L. REV. 445 (1954). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol52/iss3/7 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1954] REcENT DECISIONS 445 
RECENT DECISIONS 
ADMIRALTY - Excr.usIVE CoVERAGE BY LoNGSHOREMEN's AND H.ARBoR 
WoRKERs' Acr oF RArr.wAY EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY To EMPLOYEE FOR Ac-
CIDENT ON CAR FLOAT-Respondent, a freight brakeman employed by peti-
tioning railroad at its Jersey City yards, was injured while releasing the hand 
brakes on a freight car which was being pulled off a car float docked in navigable 
waters. He brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,1 alleging 
that his injury was caused by a faulty brake mechanism maintained in violation 
of the Safety Appliance Acts.2 The suit was dismissed in the district court3 on 
the ground that the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act4 applied ex-
clusively, because the injury occurred on navigable waters. The court of ap-
peals reversed, holding that this act did not apply, since respondent's employ-
ment was not maritime in nature.5 Held, on certiorari, such a case is within 
the exclusive coverage of the Harbor Workers' Act. Four justices dissented. 
Pennsylvania R. Co. 11. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334, 73 S.Ct. 302 (1953). 
The decision in the principal case is the latest addition to the ever-growing 
body of case and statute law which owes its existence to the ruling of the Jensen 
case.6 There the Supreme Court held that a state workmen's compensation act 
could not be applied to a stevedore engaged in unloading a ship if the injury 
took place on navigable waters, because application of the local law would 
prejudice the uniformity required of maritime law by the constitutional grant 
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the federal courts.7 After several 
unsuccessful attempts to bring Jensen and workers with similar jobs under state 
compensation coverage,8 Congress in 1927 passed the Longshoremen's and 
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. This legislation provides the injured 
worker an exclusive remedy against his employer,9 but coverage is limited to 
those cases where the state law cannot be applied because of the Jensen doc-
trine.10 The act also excepts the master and crew members of vessels, who are 
1 35 Stat. L. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. (1946) §51 et seq. 
2 27 Stat. L. 531 (1893), as amended, 45 U.S.C. (1946) §1 et seq. 
s O'Rourke v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 506. 
444 Stat. L. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §§901 to 950. 
5 O'Rourke v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (2d Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 612. 
6 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524 (1917). 
7 For a discussion of the impact of this doctrine and its subsequent history see RoBIN-
soN, .ADMIRALTY 99 et seq. (1939). 
s In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 40 S.Ct. 438 (1920), the 
Supreme Court held that the Jensen doctrine of uniformity required the invalidation of 
an amendment which added to the saving-to-suitors clause of the statute dealing with 
admiralty jurisdiction the words, "and .to claimants the rights and remedies under the 
workmen's compensation law of any state." 40 Stat. L. 395 (1917), as amended, 28 
U.S.C. (1946) §§41(3), 371. A later congressional attempt to accomplish the same result 
under a different guise met a similar fate in State of Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 
U.S. 219, 44 S.Ct. 302 (1924). 
9 "The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this title shall be exclusive 
and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee. • • ." 44 Stat. L. 
1426 (1927), 33 u.s.c. (1946) §905. 
1o 44 Stat. L. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. (1946) §903(a). 
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left to their traditional admiralty remedies.11 The court's task in marking out 
these jurisdictional boundary lines has been difficult. In deciding whether the 
state act may be validly applied in a particular case, two factors must be con-
sidered: (I) the locus of the injury, and (2) the character of the employment 
of the injured worker. If the duties of the work~r do not relate to commerce 
or navigation but are ''local" in character, his remedy is under the state act even 
though the injury takes place on navigable waters. This is the "maritime-but-
local" doctrine, a limitation on the rule of the Jensen case.12 The real dispute 
in the principal case concerns the significance of the character of the employment 
when the problem is choosing between the Federal Employers' Liability Act 
and the Harbor Workers' Act rather than between a state compensation act and 
the Harbor Workers' Act.13 The majority did not feel that the character of the 
duties of the particular employee injured was significant. Their reasoning was 
that by its own terms14 the statute 'applies to accidents on navigable waters 
whenever the employer has any employees engaged in maritime service, ir-
respective of the nature of the duties of the particular worker injured. An 
earlier Supreme Court decision, Nogueira 11. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co.,15 
was relied on by both the majority and the dissent. In that case it was held 
that a railroad employee injured while loading freight into a railroad car resting 
on a car-Boat came under the Harbor Workers' Act. From the standpoint of 
maritime employment, the Court said it made no difference whether freight 
was loaded into the hold of a vessel or into a freight car resting on top of a 
vessel; therefore, the Jensen case was directly controlling.16 The four dissenting 
11 Ibid. 
12 Thus, it was held that a carpenter. injured while engaged in construction of a 
vessel could recover under the state act. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 
469, 42 S.Ct. 157 (1922). It has been suggested by at least one case that there may be a 
twilight zone rather than a boundary line between state and federal coverage, and that 
either act may apply to accidents occurring within this zone. Davis v. Dept. of Labor and 
Industry of Washington, 317 U.S. 249, 63 S.Ct. 225 (1942). 
13 ''The Compensation Act in Sections 903(a) and 902(4), by indirection at least, 
provides "that employment in maritime service and injury upon navigable waters are the 
bases of coverage." O'Rourke v. Pennsylvania R. Co., note 5 supra, at 614. "The Court 
of Appeals, we think, is in error in holding that the statute requires, as to the employee, 
both injury on navigable water and maritime employment as a ground for coverage by the 
Compensation Act." Principal case at 340. 
14 ''The term 'employer' means an employer any of whose employees are employed 
in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the United 
States (including any dry dock)." 44 Stat. L. 1425 (1927), 33 U.S.C. (1946) §902(4). 
15 281 U.S. 128, 50 S.Ct. 303 (1930). 
16 Later lower court opinions dealing with similar fact situations and following the 
Nogueira case looked almost exclusively to the locus of the injury when faced with a 
choice between the Federal Employers' Liability Act and the Harbor Workers' Act. See 
Buren v. Southern Pac. Co., (9th Cir. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 407, cert. den. 284 U.S. 638, 
52 S.Ct. 20 (1931); Richardson v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 233 App. Div. 603, 
253 N.Y.S. 789 (1931); Job v. Erie R. Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 79 F. Supp. 698; Gussie 
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 1 N.J. Super. 293, 64 A. (2d) 244 (1949), cert. den. 338 U.S. 
869, 70 S.Ct. 145 (1949). A contrary case is Zientek v. Reading Co., (D.C. Pa. 1950) 
93 F. Supp. 875, but the result is based on a misreading of the 1939 amendment to the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act. See Job v. Erie R. Co., supra. 
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justices in the principal case said the only question was whether respondent 
was engaged in maritime employment at the time of his injury. The duties of 
a railroad brakeman stamp his employment as "railroad" and not "maritime," 
the dissent argued, and therefore the case is distinguishable from the Nogueira 
case.17 The dissent does not explain the basis for its assumption that the duties 
of the particular employee must be maritime rather than railroad. The position 
of the majority seems partly a reflection of a fear expressed by the dissent in the 
court of appeals that the courts would be heading into a "chartless morass"18 
if it were necessary to determine in every case whether the injured railway 
workman's duties were railroad or maritime in order to decide under which act 
he must seek his remedy against the employer. Placing the emphasis on the 
locus of the injury provides a much more workable test for drawing the line 
between the two federal acts. Whether or not the result is justified as a matter 
of policy is another matter, since it is somewhat difficult to understand why 
a railroad brakeman's remedy against his employer should change so drastically 
when the freight car on which he is riding moves from the car-Hoat onto the 
dock. 
Richard B. Barnett, S.&l. 
17 ''The nature of the employment is certainly not maritime. It was an ordinary 
railroad chore, done by an ordinary railroad workman." Principal case at 343. 
18 O'Rourke v. Pennsylvania R. Co., note 5 supra, at 616. 
